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T
he conventional wisdom about executive
compensation is that CEOs are paid too much.
With the average CEO of a large public firm
making over $7 million per year, and with some
"superstar" CEOs making many times that amount, often
for short periods or in times of weak performance, it is
easy to accept the daim as an obvious facto The daim seems
to be supported by the nature of the pay-setting process.
The board that decides how much to pay the executive is
installed by the CEO in most cases, and is under the CEO's
personal influence. Ir is provided with most of its information
by the CEO or consultants chosen by her, and importantly,
is paying the CEO with other peoples' money.
Critics ofhigh pay argue that these other people, generally
the shareholders, are powerless to constrain CEO's salaries
because they are a diffuse and rationally disinterested
group, given their small stakes in the firm, not to mention
that CEOs camouflage the true nature and amounts of
pay. The argument is captured by a recent media account
of the pay issue: "Executive compensation is thc cancer of
corporate America. CEO's have too much power and it
has been directed at their own enrichment.'"
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Although this account has surface appeal, it fails to
withstand close scrutiny. Despite growing to high dollar
amounts, the evidence suggests that CEO pay is highly
correlated with shareholder returns, is sensitive to firm
performance, and is set in an efficient labor market. The
evidence also shows that CEO pay is not as a result ofa corrupt
process whereby the CEO effectively writes herself a check.
We can test the efficiency of CEO pay by looking at
cases in which a few sophisticated investors, betting their
own money, replace the diffuse shareholders and the
potentially corrupted board and write new executive
compensation contracts with the CEO. If contracts in
these cases, where so-called agency costs between owners
and managers are reduced, look similar to these of firms
in general, this suggests that compensation contracts are
efficient. And at the very least, that increasing the power
of shareholders to intervene in compensation decisions
is unlikely to be produce much change in compensation
forms or amounts. But before we get to this research, we
require some background on the debate.
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There are two distinct arguments in the modern criticism
of executive pay. The first is a populist argument: CEOs
are paid too much compared with the average worker. The
second is an efficiency argument: CEOs are paid inefficiently
and pay is not linked dosely with firm performance. Let
us look at each in turn.
Paid too much. The most common criticism ofpay compares
the ratio between the earnings of an average worker and
I
CEOs, noting that the ratio increased to 300 to 1 last year
compared with a ratio of 42 to 1 in 1982. There are many
oddities about this argument. For one, how are we as a
society to determine what the correct ratio should be at
any point in time? Is 300 to 1 a bad or ineíficient ratio? Is
42 to 1 a good number? Why not lOto 1 or even 1 to I?
In other words, the right question to be asking is not what
is the ratio, but what are the benefits of various ratios
compared with the costs? Moreover, we don't know whether
a growing gap is a good or bad thing from a societal
welfare point 'of view, after aU, a growing gap may show
increasing returns to education and hard work, something
that might be expected and a net benefit for society, since
it encourages investments in these things.
Since there is no easy answer the question about the
socially optimal ratio, and since the answer is, in anyevent,
likely to be different for different firms in different industries
at different times, the question for society, and, more
speciíically for state law governing firms, should not be
how much CEOs are paid, but who decides how much
they should be paid. After all, if the process for setting pay
is free from corruption and represents a market-based
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wage, it is hard to argue that the amounts are grossly
inefficient or wrong in some way. This is a subject we will
return to in a moment.
The ratio problem is, of course, not unique to CEOs.
The data show that top lawyers, football players, recording
artists, movie stars, and celebrity journalists have all seen
their wages rise dramatically in the past few decades,
especially when compared with the paralegals, equipment
managers, sound engineers, camera operators, and interns
that do work behind the scenes to make these stars look
good. Returns to talent have increased dramatically across
the board, perhaps because improvements in technology
and the globalization of markets allow individuals to
exploit thcir talent over a greater and greater asset base
with little additional cost. While this is an interesting
phenomenon that deserves greater study, it has little to do
with the current executive compensation debate. We don't
see critics lamenting the rising ratio of the wages ofTom
Cruise to his make-up artist or Alex Rodriquez to the hitting
coach for the Yankees, and this should tell us something
about the real issue in the CEO debate-it is about political
power in corporate America, not about populist criticism
of some people who happened to make ir rich. The CEO
pay issue has political salience in part because of who
the CEOs are and in part because they are earning the
money that might arguably belong to others, be they
providers of labor or capital. This is why the "Say on Pay"
bill designed to give shareholders a voice over compensation
has political constituen'ts-the argument is that CEOs are
stealing from shareholders in a way that A-Rod isn't when
he demands hundreds of millions of dollars from George
Steinbrenner to play third base for the Yankees. Again,
we'll come back to this shordy.
Finally, the pay-ratio argument ignores the fact that
American businesses look very different today than they
did in 1982. Most obviously, the average CEO tenure in
1982 was over 10 years, while today it is about 4 years and
falling. After accounting for this drop, which, by the way,
sure doesn't sound like CEOs are getting more powerful,
the growth in total expected CEO pay is far less dramatic,
amounting to less than 5 percent per year. In addition, CEOs
have faced increased risks in the form of increased disdosure
under securities laws and potential personalliability Of even
prison time as the result of Sarbanes-Oxley and a growing
number of shareholder lawsuits. CEO pay has risen in part
because it is much riskier to be a CEO these days.
In addition, American firms are, on average, much bigger
than they were in 1982. We might expect CEO pay to
bear some relation to the difficult of their job, which may
be related to size and cornplexity, and to their success in
creating shareholder value. One test of this is to compare
the ratio of total executive compensation to firm market
value or total firm sales. Recent research shows that this
ratio today is much less than it was from 1940 to 1960,
and is about the same as the average over the period from
1960 to the present. This suggests that the ratio is not out
ofwhack, but merely reflects changes inherent in the size
of the firms that CEOs happen to run.
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American businesses are also much more profitable and
valuable than they were in 1982. The growth in CEO pay
is almost entirely explained by the fact that CEOs are paid
primarily with equity, and as firm size value has grown, so
has pay. (Ir is worth noting that in many countries CEOs
were historically paid with cash instead of equity-stock
options were illegal in Germany until very recendy-and
this helps explain in large part international pay gaps). In
1982, to use that magical year when CEOs andworkers
were paid at a reasonable ratio, the average CEO was paid
like a bureaucrat, receiving a salary and a bonus that was
tied to some measure of performance, typically revenue
growth. Because pay was modest and was largely de-linked
from shareholder returns, the evidence shows that CEOs
managed firms in ways that maximized their own utility
rather than that of their masters, the shareholder owners of
the firmo For example, managers had incentives to be risk
averse, lest they be fired, and to build ernpires, so they
could demand a greater salary and to increase their prestige.
Starting in the mid-1980s, firms started paying CEOs
like -owners, giving them shares of the company stock in
the form of options. CEOs now had incentives to maximize
profit. Over this period, thc growth in CEO compensation
has been almost entirely explained by this equity component.
(The growth in cash compensation has been less than
5 percent per year over the past 20 years, compared with a
constant growth rate of over 50 percent per year for equity
compensation). In other words, CEOs are rich today
because they have presided over firms that have made
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shareholders rich too. In fact, comparing median total
return to shareholders (price appreciation plus dividends)
and CEO pay over the past 10 years shows that they move
in unisono This can also be seen by overlaying the growth
in CEO pay since the 1980s over a curve of market
capitalization of u.s. equity markets; again, the curves
move together in lockstep (both up and down) precisely
because CEO pay is so sensitive to firm market performance
(Figure 1). (An important footnore here is that paying with
options gaye some executives incentives to manipulate stock
prices for personal benefit. There are, of course, downsides
to every form of compensation, and the question should not
be whether some executives misbehaved, but whether the
net benefits from equity pay exceed the costs.)
The fact that shareholder wealth has increased over this
period is not the end of the argument. Ir merely begs the
question of whether CEOs are taking a disproportionate
share of gains, either because they are being compensated
for things beyond their control (e.g., the market or firm
value would have gone up anyway) or because they misuse
their power over the pay-setting process to reward
themselves-taking what economists call "rents"-at the
expense of their shareholder masters. This, like the
question-begging out-of-whack-ratio problem above,
leads us inexorably to a discussion of the efficiency of the
compensation setting process and the compensation
bargains that result from it. If these are efficient, there is
not much more, short of legislating CEO pay amounts,
that we as society can do about it.
lnefficiently paid. Arguments about how much CEOs
should be paid lead inevitably to how CEOs are paid and
who decides how much. The pay-setting process for most
firms is the same: the board, on advice from compensation
consultants, decides how much to pay the CEO, who,
although technically employed by the board, has tremendous
power over them. This circularity ofpower leads compensation
critics like Lucian Bebchuk of the Harvard Law School to
argue that CEO pay is not based on performance, but
instead is based on managerial power. He and co-author
Jesse Fried wrote an entire book on this subject, premised
on the assumption that "[f]lawed compensation arrangements
have been widespread, persistent, and systemic, and they
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have stemmed from defects in the underlying governance
structure that enable executives to exercise considerable
iníluence over their boards.'? This inefficiency view is shared
by former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt, who wrote recently
that "excessive compensation ... packages are a consequence
of boards falling victim to a seduction by the CEO and the
solution is, in part, to create greater boarď independence."
The managerial power view asserts that executive
compensation contracts made through the typical board
process are decidedly not negotiated at arrn's length. The
specific factors limiting the ability of boards to do so are:
(1) the power of the CEO over the appointment of
r---------------------------------. directors; (2) the ability of the
Figure 1 CEO to reward cooperative$15 ,...---------------------------. 12,000
directors; (3) the social and
psychological iníluences the
CEO has over directors, such
as the power of friendship,
loyalty, collegiality, and
authority; (4) the cognitive
biases of directors that come
from being CEOs or former
CEOs themselves; and (5) the
time and informational barriers
most directors face to making
an informed and reasoned
decision about pay.
Bebchuk and Fried also argue
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that certain methods of compensation, such as traditional
(non-indexed, at-the-money) stock options are suboptimal
from an efficiency perspective. The argument is that
traditional options do not provide as much incentive bang
for the buck as indexed options with a strike price above
the current market price. For example, if an oil firm grants
the CEO 100,000 non-indexed, at-the-rnoney options on
January 1, and on July 1 the price of oil increases (because
of, say, a crisis in the Middle East), caus ing the firm's stock
price to rise $10 per share, the CEO will earn $1 million
largely thanks to events outside of his control. In addition,
because the shares of alloil firms will rise, shareholders in
this firm get nothing from this payment that they could
not have received from holding a diversified basket of oil
firm securities. Ir would be more efficient, the argument
goes, to set the strike price above the market price (to give
the executive an incentive to increase share value above a
certain threshold level) and to link compensation to
firm-specific performance by comparing the firm's
performance with an index of other firms in that industry.
Because this compensation design is rather straightforward
and yet not used by firms, it is believed that the "design
of option programs is consistent with the presence of
managerial power,"
A first response to the claim that pay is de-linked from
performance is to look at the data. Recent work by Steve
Kaplan and Joshua Rauh, my colleagues across the Midway
at the Graduate School of Business, shows that pay and
performance are actually tightly linked: top decile firms
(in pay) outperflrm their industries by over 60 percent,
while the bottom decile firms (in pay) underperjorm their
industries by about 20 percent.' This comports with the
evidence discussed above, showing that CEO pay has risen
and fallen consistently with the stock market. For example,
average real CEO pay reached its peak at the height of the
stock market in 2000, and has faUen along with the stock
market almost 30 percent over the past three years. Also,
as noted above, CEO tenure has fallen by half over the
past decade, which casts some serious doubt on the FuU
Monty version of the managerial power theory.
A second bit of research looks instead at the pay-setting
process in a special case where managerial power is
reduced to see what impact the reduction has on how
and how much CEOs are paid. I looked at about 80 firms
in financial distress that were reorganized under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code or worked out debt privately
CED tenura has Iallan by halí
ovar tne past decada, Wh.Lh
casts suma aeriaus dnutn on
1he FuU mon1y varsinn of 1hE
rnanagEf.a� pOWEf 1hEOfy.
to see whether pay practices, say the use of nonindexed
options, changed once sophisticated investors were in
charge ofwriting compensation contracts."
The primary effect of bankruptcy is to wipe out the
claims of the distant, diffuse, and disinterested shareholders,
the ones that managerial power theorists claim allow
managers to get away with rent extraction, and to leave
only sophisticated investors, such as banks, insurance
companies, hedge funds, and specialty bondholders
known as "vulture investors". These investors are specialist,
repeat players in workouts or distressed investing. They
achieve control either by buying significant blocks of a
íirm's outstanding debt or by agreeing to loan the debtor
additional funds, subject to restrictive debt covenants that
grant the lender contractual control of many of the firm's
activities. In most cases, the holders ofbank debt consolidate
their interests in and around financial distress by creating a
single credit facility that reorders thc existing debt of many
providers and pumps new cash into the debtor. A similar
consolidation happens with the bond debt, which vulture
investors buy up in order to secure a blocking position in
the reorganization process. The end result is that these 80
cases, like most other bankruptcies, the thousands of
shareholders are replaced with a few, highly sophisticated
investors betting huge amounts of money on turning the
firm from distress to profitability.
CEO power over pay is greatly reduced in these cases.
For one, existing CEO compensation contracts were ripped
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